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Abstract
We study the underground economy in a dynamic and stochastic general
equilibrium framework. Our model combines limited tax enforcement with
an otherwise standard two-sector neoclassical stochastic growth model. The
Bayesian estimation of the model based on Italian data provides evidence in
favor of an important underground sector in Italy, with a size that has steadily
increased over the whole sample period. We show that this pattern is due
to a persistent increase in taxation. Fiscal policy experiments suggest that
a moderate tax cut, along with a stronger eort in the monitoring process,
causes a sensitive reduction in the size of the underground economy and
positive stimulus to the regular sector that jointly increase the total scal
revenues.
Keywords: DSGE, Underground Economy, Tax Evasion, Bayesian
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1. Introduction
The underground economy represents a major issue when studying an
economic system because of its large impact on public nances and of its
distorting eects on production through the unfair competition among rms.
Furthermore, the social costs can increase because the overall tax burden be-
comes shared among a smaller number of citizens, thus increasing economic
Email addresses: renzo.orsi@unibo.it (Renzo Orsi), davide.raggi@unibo.it
(Davide Raggi), fturino@merlin.fae.ua.es (Francesco Turino)
1
inequality, and because of the lack of labor protection for the individuals who
are working in the underground market. Therefore, in studying the under-
ground economy, the analysis of the conveniences that occur in an irregular
mode of production involving the complicity of the workers themselves then
takes on considerable signicance. These situations allow business activi-
ties to be established in conditions that lead people to accept lower incomes
and fewer guarantees in the workplace, making the birth and development of
productive initiatives possible with a very low investment.
The available empirical evidence shows that the irregular economy is a
relevant issue for most countries, although to dierent extents. In fact, the
underground economy is universally widespread; it is present in developing
as well as in advanced economies. In particular, there exists evidence of a
growing trend for irregular economies due to the combined eects of interna-
tional competition and the high fragmentation of working organizations (see
e.g. Schneider et al., 2010). Furthermore, legal activities conducted under-
ground to escape taxation appear to be the faster growing component of the
irregular economy, largely because of the structure of the tax systems.
Because of its latent nature, the underground economy is dicult to mea-
sure and study empirically and, even if the law enforcement and taxation
ocials readily admit that the underground economy is a widespread phe-
nomenon, it is dicult to agree on its size. Examining the literature on
the underground economy, we recognize that there has been a good deal of
progress in ascertaining the data and developing techniques to quantify its
size and importance, even if the discussion regarding the most appropriate
methodology to quantify this phenomena is still ongoing.
Taking into account the aspects mentioned above, in this paper we tackle
the issue of measuring the underground economy using a structural econo-
metric approach, which exploits equilibrium conditions from an economic
model to provide estimates for unobservable variables. We follow the idea
that unobserved data may be derived from a well-behaved theoretical model
by using the so called theory for measurement approach, as implemented
for the rst time by Ingram et al. (1997). To this end, we build and esti-
mate, using a Bayesian approach, a dynamics stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model that explicitly accounts for concealed transactions. The in-
ferential procedure that we use, which is based on the Markov chain Monte
Carlo methods (MCMC), allows us to estimate the dynamics of the unob-
servable underground economy together with the parameters of the model.
This approach strongly departs from the classical methodologies proposed
2
in literature for studying underground economy, providing, in our opinion,
two main advantages. First, because it is theory-based, we believe that the
DSGE methodology provides a deeper understanding of the causes of the
underground economy. Second, the estimated model allows to assess from a
general equilibrium perspective scal policy implications of the underground
economy.
The model we propose combines incomplete tax enforcement a la Alling-
ham and Sadmo (1974) with an otherwise standard two-sector neoclassical
stochastic growth model. In this environment, the underground economy
emerges as a result of the agents' incentives to conceal their transactions in
order to escape taxation. This structure is adapted from Busato and Chiarini
(2004) who are among the rst to include the underground economy in a
DSGE model. Our model diers from their in three main aspects. First,
we allow for labor adjustments along the intensive margin. This property is
important in order to relax sign restrictions on the co-movements among vari-
ables that are implied by Busato and Chiarini model. Second, we consider a
richer set of exogenous shocks, which are necessary to take the model to the
data. More precisely, in addition to scal and sectorial-specic technological
shocks, we also consider preference and investment-specic shocks. These
additional shocks have been proved to be important to explain the variabil-
ity of data at the business cycle frequencies (see e.g. Smets and Wouters,
2007; Justiniano et al., 2010). Third, our model features a deterministic
growth rate driven by labor-augmenting technological progress. Because of
this property, the data do not need to be detrended before estimation.
We estimate the model using Italian quarterly data in the interval from
1982:Q1 to 2006:Q4. Italy is an interesting case study because, according to
the available evidence, the relevance of the underground economy appears
to be larger in this country with respect to other developed countries (see
Schneider et al., 2010). Furthermore, the recent severe sovereign debt crisis
in Italy requires policy makers to propose eective policies to ght against
tax evasion.1 The results of the Bayesian estimation provide evidence in favor
of a sizeable underground sector in Italy, which on average accounts for 23%
of GDP. This number is about 4 percentage points larger than the ocial
estimates. According to our results, the size of the underground economy
1It should be stressed, however, that our method is general enough to be easily adapted
to other countries.
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has steadily increased over the whole sample period, and this pattern is
primarily explainable by the persistent increase in taxation that occurred in
Italy since the eighties. Moreover, we nd that the cyclical component of the
underground economy is negatively correlated with the cyclical component
of the ocial output, thus providing evidence of a double business cycle
in the Italian economy. The estimated model is then used to assess the
implications of alternative scal policies. We nd that at the actual tax
rates, Italy is on the slippery side of the steady-state Laer curve, and can
improve its budgetary situation by either reducing taxes or increasing the
tax enforcement. However, the analysis of transitional dynamics reveals that
for the government would be optimal to undertake a mix between the above
two policies as, according to our ndings, this turns out to be the only scal
adjustment that can improve welfare and, at the same time, permanently
increase scal revenues.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 denes what is meant by
underground economy and reviews the literature, emphasizing the method-
ologies that have been implemented to measure this phenomenon. The DSGE
model is presented in Section 3, whereas the inferential methodologies and
the description of the data are included in Section 4. The empirical results
are provided in Section 5, and the policy implications are analyzed in Section
6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Current approaches in estimating the underground economy
Information about underground economic activities, their magnitude and
the manner in which these actions occur are dicult to obtain because they
do not belong to the ocial economy, and the individuals involved do not
want to be identied. Thus, the only possible method for quantifying the
size of the underground economy is through estimation. Many attempts have
been made, and several dierent methods are employed for this purpose, as
demonstrated by a vast literature (Schneider, 2005 and Schneider and Enste,
2002, among others), even if disagreements still exist regarding the denition
as well as the best approach for estimating the underground economy.
At this purpose, OECD addressed this question almost a decade ago
(OECD, 2002), proposing denitions and harmonization procedures to inte-
grate the underground economy into the gross national product (GNP). The
objective was to provide an indirect measurement of the economic activities
that are not included in the ocial statistics but are still relevant to the
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economy of a country. Furthermore, starting from the 1990s, the statistical
oces of the OECD countries adopted the international denition established
according to the SNA93 and SEC95 accounting systems, which represent a
reference for the national accounts estimates and guarantee homogeneity in
the statistical evaluation of GDP gures. To provide a denition that makes
the concept of underground economy comparable and fairly uniform for the
countries belonging to the European community, the European Union's sta-
tistical oce (Eurostat) has provided details on how to account for the non
observed economy and monitors compliance with these directives in their
denition of the national accounts of the member countries.
In particular, non (directly) observed economy is composed as follows:
- The underground economy, which regards legal production that is not
ocial and is not recorded because of tax and contributory evasion,
tax labor regulations evasion and the non-observance of administrative
rules.
- The informal economy, which includes all legal activities carried out
by individuals, small or home enterprises (part-time secondary work,
moonlighting, baby-sitting and so on) and goods and services produced
and consumed within the household. For these activities, it is very di-
cult, or even impossible, to rely on statistical observation and measure-
ment, even if they are not directed toward tax evasion. Thus, they are
not included in the genuine underground economy, as dened above.
- The illegal economy or criminal economy, which includes all economic
activities that violate penal norms, such as the illegal drug business,
prostitution, and other criminal activities.
Throughout the paper, we refer to the underground economy as the pro-
duction of legal commodities and services that are deliberately concealed
from the public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes or social security
contributions. This denition therefore does not include the informal and
criminal activities since they do not lead to tax evasion. In other words, in
our denition, the irregularities that are related to the underground economy
rely on the ways that regular economic activities are conducted.
The taxonomy of the methods for estimating the underground economy
most frequently encountered in the literature distinguishes between direct
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methods and indirect methods. Direct approaches are implemented essen-
tially at a microeconomic level, and are mainly based on surveys of house-
holds and businesses, or on data generated by the tax supervision. Indirect
methods infer the size of the underground economy by comparing macroeco-
nomic indicators. For example, they compare the income produced annually
with the income annually used for consumption, investment and savings; or
alternatively they compare electric input power with industrial output, or
even compare the actual currency demand with the demand for currency in
the absence of taxation (Cagan, 1958; Tanzi, 1980, 1983; Gutmann, 1977).
A third methodology is model based, in which the underground economy
is treated as a latent variable. This is known as multiple indicator multiple
cause (MIMIC) which is based on a factor model (see for instance Frey and
Weck-Hannemann, 1984 and Giles, 1999). This approach has an attractive-
ness in the context of the underground analysis, since the idea is to represent
the output of the underground economy as a latent variable or index, which
has causes and eects that are observable but which cannot itself be directly
measured, The observed variables in the model are classied in causal and
indicators, which are connected by a single unobserved index. Values of the
index over time are inferred from data on causes and indicators by estimat-
ing the statistical model and predicting the index. The tted index is then
interpreted as a time series estimate of the underground economy.
The approach that we propose in this paper does not belong specically
to any of these categories, and thus we name it as structural model approach.
In fact, we build and estimate a DSGE model with irregular transactions and
we get the underground economy in the form of latent variable.
3. Model
We consider an economy that consists of a continuum of homogenous
goods that are indexed by i 2 [0; 1], each produced by a perfectly competitive
producer. Goods are sold by rms to a continuum of measure 1 of identical
households for consumption and investment purposes and to the government,
which collects taxes from households and rms to nance public spending.
The economy is divided into a regular and an unocial sector, and none
of the transactions that occur in the latter are recorded by the government
authorities. Firms therefore use factors from the underground markets to
hide part of their production to evade taxation. In each period of time,
however, rms face a non-negligible probability of being inspected by the
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scal authorities, convicted of tax evasion and forced to pay taxes that are
augmented by a penalty surcharge. Households might also evade personal
income taxation by reallocating their labor services from the regular to the
underground sector. All of the interactions between rms, households and the
government occur in a stochastic environment where the short-run dynamics
of the economy are driven by productivity, demand, and scal shocks.
3.1. Firms
Each rm i uses regular labor hmi;t, and capital ki;t to produce regular
output via a Cobb-Douglas production function
ymi;t = At
 
 th
m
i;t

(ki;t)
1  (1)
where  2 (0; 1), At is a purely transitory technological shock,2 while  t is the
labor augmenting technological progress, which follows a deterministic trend
of the form  t =  t 1 with  > 1. Every unit of output produced is taxed
at the stochastic corporate tax rate,  ct < 1,
3 but compliance is only partial,
and rms can hide part of their production to evade taxes. To produce
underground output, rms combine labor hired in the unocial market, hui;t,
with capital via the following Cobb-Douglass technology:
yui;t = Bt
 
 th
u
i;t
u
(ki;t)
1 u (2)
where Bt is a purely transitory technological shock, and u 2 (0; 1].
The assumption of sector-specic technological shocks incorporates po-
tentially important inter-sectorial dierences in labor productivity into the
model.4 This property is consistent with the available empirical evidence that
documents a clear association between the level of education and participa-
tion in the irregular labor market (see e.g. Marcelli et al., 1999; Gallaway
2The process that governs the evolution of stochastic shocks will be introduced shortly.
3To keep the analysis relatively simple, our model abstracts from the endogenous scal
policies that determine the evolution of the marginal tax rates. We thus treated the latter
as aggregate stochastic disturbances.
4An alternative way to introduce this property into the model is to assume that the
goods that are produced in the two sectors are manufactured with the same technology but
that rms have to pay an additional cost for every unit of underground output produced.
We prefer to rely on sector-specic production functions to take into account the labor-
intensive nature of underground production activities.
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and Bernasek, 2002).5 The idiosyncratic shock Bt can also be interpreted as
capturing exogenous changes in the overall labor force that primarily aect
irregular workers productivity. For example, several empirical papers have
documented that most workers hired under irregular work arrangements are
immigrants (see e.g. Leonard, 1998). As noted by Busato and Chiarini (2004),
it is reasonable to believe that these individuals have strong incentives to be
very productive to increase the probability of being hired as regular workers.6
An increase in legal immigration might therefore result in a temporary boost
to the underground sector's productivity.7
Let pmi;t and p
u
i;t denote the price of the i   th good in the regular and
unocial markets, respectively. Following Busato and Chiarini (2004), we
assume that a good that is produced in the underground sector is indistin-
guishable from the regular goods, and therefore, at equilibrium, their prices
must be the same.8 Thus, without loss of generality, we will impose here-
after that pmi;t = p
u
i;t = Pt 8 i 2 [0; 1], where Pt is the market price of each
good that the perfectly competitive rms take as given. Because the goods
that are produced in the two markets are homogenous, the total nal output
produced by a rm i at date t, namely yi;t, can be simply dened as
yi;t = y
m
i;t + y
u
i;t (3)
According to equation (3), a rm is always allowed to produce a total
5These papers show that in urban settings, highly skilled individuals are more likely to
work in the regular sector, whereas those with the lowest level of education have a higher
probability of working in the irregular sector.
6In most of the Western European countries, for example, immigrants enter with tem-
porary visas that are converted to permanent visas when they become regular workers.
7The idiosyncratic cost Bt might also capture the movements in the labor force that, by
denition, are specic to the irregular sector, such as those implied by illegal immigration
or by workers that are ocially inactive or retired.
8This assumption embodies the idea that customers in the regular markets are unable
to detect which products are manufactured by irregular workers. While realistic for com-
modities, this hypothesis is somewhat too restrictive in the case of specic services where
underground transactions often result from direct agreements between customers and pro-
ducers. In these circumstances, the customers' costs for regular and underground service
cannot be equal at equilibrium. One way to incorporate this feature into our framework
is to specify a service sector where customers face a dierent demand for underground
and regular services and pay valued added taxes only on the latter. We, however, de-
cided to abstract from this possibility because tax evasion of this nature is likely to be
quantitatively negligible.
8
output of yi;t using only the regular technology. The unocial productive
factors are therefore not strictly necessary to produce the nal output. As
a result, the underground production takes place in our model primarily
because the rms aim to take advantage of tax evasion.
To discourage concealed transactions, the government enforces a moni-
toring process. Following Allingham and Sadmo (1974), we assume that on
each date t, rms face a not-zero probability p 2 (0; 1) of being inspected
and forced to pay the tax rate  ct on the concealed production, augmented
by a penalty surcharge factor s > 1. As a result, for a given market price Pt,
the total expected net revenues from an amount of nal output yi;t at time t
are given by:
Et fNR(yi;t)g = Pt

(1   ct )ymi;t + (1  ps ct )yui;t

(4)
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional on in-
formation available at time t. This expression shows that as long as (1 ps ct )
> 0, the rms have an incentive to produce the underground output because
the revenues from this activity are expected to be positive.
The capital and labor markets are perfectly competitive. The cost of
renting capital is equal to the nominal rental rate Rt paid per unit of capital.
The total cost of labor instead depends on whether the rms hire workers in
the regular or in the underground sector. More precisely, we assume that the
cost of labor in the regular market is represented by the nominal wage paid
for one unit of labor services Wmt , augmented by a stochastic social security
tax rate  st < 1, whereas the cost of labor hired in the underground market
is given by the nominal wage, W ut . Accordingly, the total costs for a rm i,
namely TC, are dened as follows:
TC(hmi;t; h
u
i;t; ki;t) = (1 + 
s
t )W
m
t h
m
i;t +Rtki;t +W
u
t h
u
i;t (5)
Given the equations (4) and (5), the optimal amount of nal output
produced by a rm i at date t is the solution of the following static problem:8>>>>><>>>>>:
max
hmi;t;h
u
i;t;ki;t
Et fNR(yi;t)g   TC(hmi;t; hui;t; ki;t)
s:t:
ymi;t = At
 
 th
m
i;t

(ki;t)
1 
yui;t = Bt
 
 th
u
i;t
u
(ki;t)
1 u
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where the vector of prices fPt;W ut ;Wmt ; Rtg is taken as given. The associated
optimal planning satises the following three conditions:
(1   ct )(1  )
ymi;t
ki;t
+ (1  ps ct )(1  u)
yui;t
ki;t
=
rt
1   ct
(6)

ymi;t
hmi;t
=
wmt (1 + 
s
t )
1   ct
(7)8<: u
yui;t
hui;t
=
wut
1 psct if 1  ps
c
t > 0
hui;t = 0; otherwise:
(8)
where rt = Rt=Pt, w
m
t = W
m
t =Pt and w
u
t = W
u
t =Pt, respectively, denote
the real rental rate, the real wage paid in the regular labor market and the
real wage paid in the underground sector. Equations (6) and (7) describe
the optimal demand for capital and regular labor, respectively. Equation
(8) instead describes the optimal demand for underground labor services.
Accordingly, as long as 1  ps ct > 0, a rm demands irregular labor until
its marginal productivity equates to its marginal cost, where the latter is
given by the real wage wut discounted by the expected real revenue from an
additional unit of underground output, 1 ps ct . Conversely, when 1 ps ct <
0, the rms have no incentive to hire irregular workers to produce nal output
because the real revenues from the underground sector are expected to be
negative. In this case, total output is entirely produced with the regular
technology (i.e., hui;t = 0), and therefore, rms do not evade taxation.
3.2. The representative Household
The representative household has preferences in period 0 given by:
Uht =
1X
t=0
tE0
(
(ct= t)
(1 )   1
1     
h
t B0
(hmt + h
u
t )
1+
1 + 
 B1 (h
u
t )
1+
1 + 
)
(9)
where  > 0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 
2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount factor, B0  0 and B1  0 are preference
parameters controlling for the disutility of working activities, and  > 0 and
 > 0 respectively denote the inverse labor supply elasticities of aggregate
and underground labor supplies. ht represents a purely transitory demand
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shock that aects the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure.9
The specication of preference implies that households take utility from
consumption relative to the rate of technology  t. This assumption ensures
that the economy evolves along a balanced growth path. As in An and
Schorfheide (2007), we interpret  t as an exogenous habit component. The
specication of the disutility of total hours worked (hmt + h
u
t ) is standard,
and allows for perfect labor mobility across sectors. The last term in equa-
tion (9) implies that households face an idiosyncratic cost of working in the
underground sector. It might be interpreted as capturing the cost associated
with the lack on any social and health insurance in the underground sector.10
Households supply labor services per unit of time and rents to rms what-
ever capital they own. We assume that the capital stock, kt, held by house-
holds evolves over time according to the following law of motion
kt+1 = 
x
t xt + (1  k) kt (10)
where xt denotes the investment at date t, and k 2 [0; 1] is the capital
depreciation rate. Following Justiniano et al. (2010), we assume that the
eciency with which the nal good can be transformed into physical capital
is random and determined by the purely transitory exogenous shock xt . As
shown in Greenwood et al. (1988), a stochastic disturbance of this type is
equivalent to a sector-specic technological shock that aects the production
of investment goods in a simple two-sector model. As such, this assumption
is useful to capture the potentially dierent sources of uctuations between
consumption and investment.11
Households might evade income taxes by reallocating their labor services
from the regular to the irregular labor markets. The underground-produced
income ows, wut h
u
h;t are, therefore, not subject to the stochastic income tax
rate ht < 1. Under these assumptions, the household's period-by-period real
9This assumption has been introduced mainly because, according to the available em-
pirical evidence, a shock to the disutility of labor of this form turns out to be particularly
important to allow the actual dynamics of the worked hours in the estimated DSGE models
to be captured (see e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007).
10An alternative interpretation is that parameter B1 measures the degree of households'
tax morality (see e.g., Gordon, 1989).
11This is particularly important because both consumption and investment aggregates
are treated as observable variables in the model's estimate. See section 4 for further details.
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budget constraint can be written as follows:
ct + xt = (1  ht )(wmt hmt + rtkt) + wut hut (11)
The utility maximization problem for the representative household can be
stated as a matter of choosing the processes ct, h
u
t and h
m
t that maximize the
intertemporal utility function (9) subject to the law of motion of capital (10)
and to the budget constraint (11). An optimal consumption, labor supply,
and saving plan for the representative household must satisfy the following
conditions:
 
(1 )
t c
 
t = t
t
xt
= Et

t+1

(1  k)
xt+1
+ (1  ht+1)rt+1

(12)
B0 (h
m
t + h
u
t )
 ht = (1  ht )wmt t (13)
B0 (h
m
t + h
u
t )
 ht +B1 (h
u
t )
 = wut t (14)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (11). Equation (12)
is the usual Euler equation that provides the intertemporal optimality con-
dition, whereas equation (13) describes the (total) labor supply schedule.
Equation (14) describes the optimal allocation of time for the working activ-
ities in the underground sector. To gain intuition regarding the determinants
of the irregular labor supply, it is useful to combine (13) with (14) and solve
the resulting equation with respect to hut to obtain the following:
hut =
(

1

t
h
wut  (1 ht )wmt
B1
i 1

if wut   (1  ht )wmt  0
0 otherwise
(15)
This equation states that households supply labor services in the under-
ground sector as long as the wage that they earn from this activity exceeds
the net real wage that they earn by working in the regular labor market. From
this perspective, 1= stands for the Frisch elasticity of irregular labor supply
with respect to the net-of-taxes wage dierential between the underground
and the regular labor market. Additionally, for a given wage dierential,
the supply of irregular labor shifts to the left when parameter B1 increases.
Intuitively, to keep the same amount of irregular labor supplied, households
require a higher wage gap to compensate for the increased disutility that
they derive by working in the irregular sector.
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3.3. Government
In each period t, the government raises taxes to nance a given amount of
government consumption, gt. For simplicity, we abstract for public debt and
assume that public expenditures are selected on a balanced basis each period.
The period-by-period government budget constraint can then be written as
follows:
gt = 
h
t (w
m
t h
m
h;t + rtkh;t) + 
c
t
1Z
0
(psyui;t + y
m
i;t)di+ 
s
t w
m
t
1Z
0
hmi;tdi (16)
where the rst term in the right-hand side of (16) is the total scal rev-
enues from personal income taxation, Ght ; the second term is the total scal
revenues from corporate taxation, Gct ; and the last term is the total scal
revenues from the social security contributions, Gst .
Total tax evasion at date t, namely TEt, takes the following form:
TEt = (
s
t + 
h
t )w
u
t
1Z
0
hui;tdi+ (1  p) ct
1Z
0
yui;tdi
3.4. Stochastic Processes
To complete the model, we formulate productivity, demand and tax rates
disturbances as a stationary VAR(1) process
zt = (I   )z+ zt 1 + "t (17)
where zt =

log(At); log(Bt); log(
c
t ); log(
s
t ); log(
h
t ); log(
i
t); log(
h
t )
	0
, z is
a vector containing the mean values the exogenous state variables,  =
diag[a; b; c; s; h; H ; I ], and "t =

"at ; "
b
t ; "
c
t ; "
s
t ; "
h
t ; "
I
t ; "
H
t
	0
is the vector
of zero-mean normal random innovations with diagonal variance-covariance
matrix 
 = diag[2a; 
2
b ; 
2
c ; 
2
s ; 
2
h; 
2
H ; 
2
I ].
3.5. Symmetric equilibrium
We restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria where all rms produce
the same quantity of their respective good using the same amount of ocial
and irregular productive factors. In addition, we normalize the price Pt of
goods to 1 in each period of time t. The symmetric equilibrium of the model
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is then formally derived by imposing the following clearing conditions for the
goods and the labor markets:
ct + xt + gt =
1Z
0
yi;tdi
ht =
1Z
0
(hmi;t + h
u
i;t)di
where ht denotes the total amount of time for working activities supplied by
households at date t.
Given the assumptions made for the production functions and the pref-
erences, the model's economy features a balanced growth path equilibrium
in which the variables grow at a constant rate. It is therefore convenient
to express the model in terms of detrended variables, for which there ex-
ists a deterministic steady state.12 Thus, denoting with bSt = St=t the
original variable St detrended by means of its trend t, and letting xt =
(r^t; w^
m
t ; w^
u
t ; w^
h
t ; y^
m
t ; y^
u
t ; h^
m
t ; h^
u
t ; G^
c
t ; G^
s
t ; G^
h
t ; c^t; k^t; x^t; y^t; h^t) the vector of all en-
dogenous variables, then a symmetric equilibrium for the economy can be
formally dened as an initial condition bk0 2 R+ and a process fxtg1t=0 that,
given the exogenous stochastic process fztg1t=0, satises the following system
of equations:
y^mt = At

h^mt
 
k^t
1 
(18)
y^ut = Bt

h^ut
u 
k^t
1 u
(19)
y^t = y^
m
t + y^
u
t (20)
(1   ct )(1  )
y^mt
k^t
+ (1  ps ct )(1  u)
y^ut
k^t
=
r^t
1   ct
(21)

y^mt
h^mt
=
w^mt (1 + 
s
t )
1   ct
(22)
12The perfect foresight equilibrium (or non-stochastic steady state) of the model is
derived by setting the shocks zt equal to their mean values in every period .
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(
u
y^ut
h^ut
=
w^ut
1 psct ; if 1  ps
c
t  0
h^ut = 0; otherwise.
(23)
k^t+1 = 
x
t x^t + (1  k) k^t (24)
c^t + x^t = (1  ht )(w^mt h^mt + r^tk^t) + w^ut h^ut (25)
c^ t
xt
=


Et

c^ t+1

(1  k)
xt+1
+ (1  ht+1)r^t+1

(26)
B0

h^t

ht = (1  ht )w^mt c^ t (27)
h^ut =
(

1

t
h
w^ut  (1 ht )w^mt
B1
i 1

if w^ut   (1  ht )w^mt  0
0 otherwise
(28)
h^t = h^
u
t + h^
m
t (29)
G^ht = 
h
t (w^
m
t h^
m
t + rtk^t) (30)
G^ct = 
c
t (psy^
u
t + y^
m
t ) (31)
G^st = 
s
t w^
m
t h^
m
t (32)
4. Parameter Estimates
4.1. Method
Estimation and inference are major issues when managing DSGE mod-
els. A common solution in the empirical literature is to recur to Bayesian
methods and, in particular, to MCMC algorithms (see e.g. Canova and Sala,
2009; Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez, 2007). The model, dened
through equations (18)-(32), is in fact a highly nonlinear system that can-
not be estimated in a straightforward manner. For this reason, the system
is linearized and solved to derive a more manageable reduced form. To ad-
dress these nonlinearity issues, it is common practice to linearize the system
through a rst-order Taylor expansion around its steady state. This approx-
imation leads to the following representation of the dynamic system:
 0xt = cx +  1xt 1 +  zzt +t (33)
in which xt is the endogenous state vector, zt is a zero mean autoregressive
exogenous process with shocks t, and t are the forecasting errors.  0,  1,  z,
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 and cx are matrices whose entries are functions of the structural parameters
and of the steady states of the model. Even if (33) is an approximate version
of the model, we stress that it is still a structural representation of the system
that must be solved to derive its reduced form. There are many strategies
available in the literature to overcome this problem, (see An and Schorfheide,
2007, for instance). In this paper, we use the algorithm implemented in Sims
(2002), which leads to
xt = c +xxt 1 +zzt (34)
in which the system's matrices still depend on the structural parameters 
and on the steady states. The second relevant issue for inference is that the
system cannot be estimated through standard methods because xt is partially
non-observable, and then, the likelihood cannot be computed. To manage
this problem, the vector xt is linked to a set of observable variables that are
indicated by the vector y. Using matrix notation, the observables are related
to the state vector through the following relationship:
yt = S~xt (35)
in which S is a selection matrix, whereas ~xt = (xt;xt 1) is the augmented
state vector that includes the eventual lagged observations. Equations (34)
and (35) dene a linear and a Gaussian state space system that can be han-
dled through the Kalman lter, a recursive algorithm that allows the likeli-
hood function L(yj) to be precisely evaluated even in the presence of latent
processes. Here, we base our inference on the Bayesian paradigm, which
has proved to be successful in the empirical macroeconomic literature. In
particular, Bayesian methods allow us to incorporate additional information
into the parameter estimation procedure through prior distributions, which
eventually reduces the risks of non-identication troubles for the parameters
by adding curvature to the likelihood function. The choice of these prior dis-
tributions will be extensively described in Section 4.3. Our goal is to jointly
estimate the parameter vector together with the latent process xt. In par-
ticular, we aim to evaluate the magnitude of the underground economy in
Italy. This task can be easily handled through an MCMC algorithm. Details
of the algorithm are provided in Appendix.
In this paper, all of the calculations are based on software written us-
ing the Ox c6.21 language of Doornik (2001) combined with the state space
library ssfpack of Koopman et al. (1999) and the LiRE library to solve ra-
tional expectation models of Mavroeidis and Zwols (2007). Moreover, the
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initial value (0) has been set by maximizing the posterior mode p()L(yj).
Once the initial value has been set, we build a multi-chain MCMC proce-
dure based on 4 chains of size 200,000. As stated before, the movement of
the chain is characterized by random walk dynamics, i.e.,  = (j 1) + ~j
in which ~j  N(0;). A rule of thumb to dene a optimal scaling fac-
tor  that allows for the reasonable convergence properties of the algorithm
is to guarantee an acceptance rate ranging between 25% and 35%. In our
empirical application, we found a rate of approximately 28 percent.
4.2. Data
We consider the following set of measurement equations to link our the-
oretical model to the real world economy
yt 
26664
ct
xt
Gct
Gst
Ght
wht
37775 =
266664
(Q)
(Q)
(Q)
(Q)
(Q)
(Q)
377775+ 100
2666664
c^t   c^t 1
x^t   x^t 1
G^ct   G^ct 1
G^st   G^st 1
G^ht   G^ht 1
w^ht   w^ht 1
3777775 (36)
in which ct is the consumption growth expressed in percentage terms, xt
is the investment growth, wht is the change in the gross real total earnings
paid in the regular market (i.e., wht = (1 + 
s
t )w
m
t h
h
t ), G
i
t; i = c; s; h are
the growth rates of scal revenues from corporate taxation, social security
contributions and personal income taxation, respectively, and nally (Q)
= 100log() is the common quarterly trend growth rate.
The model is estimated using the quarterly gures provided by the Ital-
ian National Institution of Statistics (ISTAT) over the full sample period
1982:1 to 2006:4.13 All of the data are in real terms (base year 2000) and
divided by the total population aged 15-64 years. The choice of the observ-
able variables is directly guided by the theory. More precisely, given that
our ultimate goal is to estimate the size and trend of the underground econ-
omy, we choose as our observables those aggregates that, according to our
model, are particularly informative regarding the magnitude of underground
economic activities. In this respect, the data on aggregate consumption and
investment proxy the general level of economic activity in Italy; the scal
13ISTAT provides data on scal revenues and labor earnings annually. Quarterly gures
for these series are made available by Associazione Prometeia of Bologna.
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revenues data captures the incentives of rms and households to engage in
underground transactions; and nally, the ocial labor earnings data are
informative on the households' opportunity cost of supplying labor services
in the underground sector.
4.3. Prior distributions and calibrated parameters
Our priors are summarized in Table 1. Overall, we considered prior den-
sities that match the domain of the structural parameters. Starting with the
underground economy-related parameters, our prior choice is mostly based
on previous analysis provided by ISTAT. More specically, the elasticity of
labor in the underground production function, u, is assumed to be a beta
random variable with a mean of 0.7026 and a standard deviation of 0.02,
while the disutility of working activities in the underground economy, B1,
is assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 15.2328 and a
standard deviation of 0.4. Conditional to all of the other prior parameter
values, the prior means of u and B1 imply a steady-state size of the under-
ground economy (Y u=Y ) and a steady-state share of the total worked hours
ascribed to the underground sector (Hu=H) of 19% and 13%, respectively.
These numbers match the estimates of the underground output-to-GDP ratio
and the irregular labor share provided by ISTAT over the 1982-2006 period.
We rmly believe that these estimates are the most reliable available regard-
ing the underground economy in Italy. For this reason, these values have
been set as the starting point for our analysis. The inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of underground labor supply  is instead described by a gamma
distribution with a mean of 0.06 and a standard deviation of 0.01. The prior
mean was chosen to be consistent with the calibration reported in Busato
et al. (2005).
For the parameters that are commonly used in the DSGE literature, our
prior choice is consistent with previous studies (An and Schorfheide, 2007,
Smets and Wouters, 2007, and Iacoviello and Neri, 2010 among others). More
precisely, we assume that the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution  and the inverse of the elasticity of the total labor supply  are
distributed according to a gamma random variable, both with a mean 1 and
a standard deviation respectively set to 0.05 and 0.1. The elasticity of labor
in the regular production function  is assumed to follow a beta distribution
with a mean of 0.65 and a standard deviation of 0.02. The capital deprecia-
tion rate k is assumed to be a beta random variable centered at a quarterly
rate of 2.5 percent, i.e., E[k] = 0:025, and with a standard deviation of 0.005.
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Finally, the common quarterly trend growth rate, Q, is assumed to follow
a Gaussian prior with a mean of 0.23 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The
prior mean is chosen to match the average growth rate of actual per-capita
GDP over the 1982-2006 period. This choice is consistent with the balanced
growth path hypothesis.
Regarding the exogenous processes, we assume that the standard error
of the innovations follow a rather dispersed inverse gamma distribution to
summarize the lack of a priori information about these quantities. The per-
sistence of the AR(1) processes (i.e., parameters a, b, c, h, s, H and
I) are instead described by beta distributions with means ranging between
0.5 and 0.9 to allow for moderate to high persistence for the propagation
mechanism for the exogenous shocks. In particular, the variances of these
priors are relatively high to account for a wide range of possible posterior
values for these parameters. This hypothesis is consistent with Smets and
Wouters (2007).
Finally, the remaining parameters are xed, either because they reect
some characteristics that are regulated ex-ante by law or because they are
dicult to identify. More specically, the steady state parameters c, h and
s, that represent the average tax rates on corporate prots and personal
income and the rate of social security contributions, respectively, are xed at
41.55%, 34.26% and 21%. These numbers are consistent with the average tax
rates imposed in Italy over the 1982-2006 period.14 Furthermore, the penalty
paid by a rm once it is detected is set to 30% of the corporate tax rate.
The surcharge factor is thus s = 1:30, consistent with the current Italian
Tax Law (Busato and Chiarini, 2004). The probability p that a company
is inspected is set to 3%, corresponding to the estimate reported by Busato
and Chiarini (2004) using data on the number of inspected rms that was
released by the Italian Ministry of Labor. The subjective discount factor 
is set to 0.9840, implying a steady-state gross interest rate of 1:0186. Finally,
the parameter controlling for the disutility of the total labor supply, B0, has
been set to a value that implies that households devote 19% of its time to
14More precisely, the values of the average tax rate on personal income and the rate of
social security contributions are taken from Busato and Chiarini (2004), while the value
of c corresponds to the average Italian statutory corporate tax rates over the 1982-2006
period. The values for statutory tax rates are taken from the OECD Tax Database. For
the 1998-2006 period, the OECD data have been augmented by 4.25% to account for the
newly introduced regional corporate taxation (IRAP).
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labor activities.15 This value corresponds to the average hours worked in a
quarter as a fraction of the total quarterly hours for the 1982-2006 period.
4.4. Posterior Distributions
Table 1 shows the posterior mean, mode, and the 95 percent probabil-
ity interval for the structural parameters, together with the mean and the
standard deviation of the prior distributions. A frequently employed and
practical way to assess the identication of the parameters is to compare the
prior to the posterior distributions to check if the observable variables are
informative for inferential purposes. These results are displayed in Figure
C.12.
A closer inspection of the parameters governing production, i.e.,  and u,
suggests that the contribution of the observed data (likelihood) is relevant.
In particular, the likelihood provides a sensitive negative shift with respect
to the prior information. Specically, the elasticity of regular production to
labor  has a posterior mean of .61, while the irregular labor elasticity u
has a posterior mean of approximately .65. The observed dierence between
the estimates for these two parameters could be interpreted as evidence in
favor of a higher output sensitivity to labor in the irregular market.
With regard to the households, the posterior estimate of the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution  is slightly smaller than its prior
counterpart even though the posterior variability is much smaller. The data
therefore suggest that consumption is somewhat more sensitive to movements
in the real interest rate than is implied by the prior distribution.
We also nd that the posterior estimate of the labor supply elasticity in
the regular market  is substantially larger than the a priori hypothesis, while
its counterpart in the irregular market  is only slightly smaller than the a
priori assumption. In particular, the posterior mean of  is small (0.056),
suggesting that the labor supply in the underground sector is highly sensitive
to movements in the net wage dierential. The estimate of k (0.033) implies
an half-life for the capital stock of about 5 years.
The parameter controlling for the disutility of irregular labor, B1, has a
posterior mean of 15.38, which is substantially equivalent to its prior mean.
This may be interpreted as a suspected lack of identication. On the other
15In the estimation procedure, this parameter is updated at any iteration using equation
(27) evaluated at the steady-state.
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Table 1: DSGE with Underground Economy - Posterior computation (MCMC)
Posterior distribution Prior information
Mean Mode 95% Cred. Int. Mean S.E. Type
p(jy) 0.6104 0.6107 [0.571,0.647] 0.650 0.020 Beta
p(kjy) 0.0339 0.0338 [0.024,0.043] 0.025 0.005 Beta
p(ujy) 0.6537 0.6536 [0.616,0.681] 0.7026 0.020 Beta
p(ajy) 0.9615 0.9629 [0.935,0.979] 0.800 0.100 Beta
p(bjy) 0.9691 0.9697 [0.952,0.981] 0.500 0.100 Beta
p(cjy) 0.9879 0.9894 [0.963,0.999] 0.900 0.100 Beta
p(hjy) 0.9956 0.9987 [0.979,0.999] 0.900 0.100 Beta
p(sjy) 0.9494 0.9521 [0.906,0.981] 0.900 0.100 Beta
p(H jy) 0.6856 0.6926 [0.483,0.842] 0.600 0.100 Beta
p(I jy) 0.9700 0.9721 [0.937,0.989] 0.800 0.100 Beta
p(jy) 0.9868 0.9862 [0.986,1.069] 1.000 0.050 Gamma
p(jy) 0.0559 0.0556 [0.038,0.074] 0.060 0.010 Gamma
p(jy) 1.1882 1.1848 [0.993,1.371] 1.000 0.100 Gamma
p(B1jy) 15.384 15.380 [14.61,16.17] 15.2328 0.400 Gamma
p(100ajy) 1.5310 1.5256 [1.330,1.758] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100bjy) 1.0432 1.0365 [0.886,1.235] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100cjy) 2.0404 2.0303 [1.782,2.356] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100hjy) 1.3731 1.3676 [1.196,1.580] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100sjy) 2.0884 2.0778 [1.833,2.396] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100H jy) 0.6296 0.5849 [0.384,1.101] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100I jy) 0.9193 0.9151 [0.708,1.162] 0.600 0.160 IG
p(100(Q)jy) 0.7043 0.6652 [0.150,1.369] 0.230 0.500 Normal
side, the estimated steady state of the underground economy is approxi-
mately 22 percent, which is about 3 percentage points larger than the ocial
statistics provided by ISTAT, that represent our prior knowledge about the
phenomenon. This empirical evidence allows to conclude that our poste-
rior estimate of the underground economy is mainly caused by the posterior
variation of u.
Turning to the exogenous processes, the autoregressive coecients pro-
vide information regarding the persistence of the shocks that describe the
mechanism of propagation for the exogenous shocks. Overall the coecients
are large and in some cases close to 1, thus providing strong evidence of shock
persistence. The variances of the exogenous shocks are clearly identied.
Finally, some convergence diagnostics are presented in Figure C.12, where
the recursive averages of the sampler have been reported. Specically, the
plot reports the evolution of 1
i
Pi
j=1 
(j);8i. Of course, it is impossible to
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assess the convergence properties of an MCMC algorithm through the study
of only a few realizations of the chains. However a common practice is to
check for the convergence of the empirical averages of the draws. (see Robert
and Casella, 1999, chap. 8 for a survey on this topic.) We can say that a chain
converges rapidly if the evolution of its empirical averages stabilizes after few
iterations. As Figure C.12 illustrates, it is quite evident that the running
averages for the algorithm stabilize quickly showing evidence of convergence
for the algorithm. According to our experience, it appears that the random
walk algorithm that is adopted needs about 100,000 iterations to converge
to its correct expected value, and, according to these results, we discarded
the rst 100,000 draws from each chain to remove the dependence from the
initial condition (0).
5. The underground economy in Italy and its sources
Having estimated the model, we now use it to address the primary ques-
tions of the paper. How large is the underground economy in Italy? How
does the underground sector respond to exogenous shocks? What are the
main driving forces of uctuations in the underground output?
5.1. The size and trend of the underground economy
Figure 1 depicts the smoothed estimate of the ratio of underground pro-
duction to GDP along with the 95 percent credible bands.16 This gure
summarizes how our model predicts the size and the trend of the under-
ground economy in Italy over the 1982-2006 period. According to the results
provided in Figure 1, the underground production accounts on average for
22.8% of GDP. This number is about 4 percentage points larger than the of-
cial estimates, and conrms that the underground sector is sizeable in Italy.
There is also strong evidence of a steep increase in the size of the under-
ground economy, leading to a change of about 10 percentage points over two
16To estimate the endogenous variables dynamics, we picked all the posterior draws
from the MCMC algorithm and, for each set of these parameters, we evaluated the latent
variables through the simulation smoother algorithm of de Jong and Shephard (1995).
Our posterior estimate is thus the average of all of the trajectories obtained, whereas the
credible bands have been computed as the 2.5 and the 97.5 percentiles of the empirical
distribution. This procedure allows us to also take into account parameter uncertainty.
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decades. In particular, the series started the sample around the 17:5%, and
then grew slowly during the 1980s, up to the 19.5%. After that period, the
series increased quickly over the nineties and then uctuates around the 27%
from 2000 until the end of the sample.17 Additionally, the estimated model
predicts two major contractions in the size of the underground economy: one
from and 1992 to 1994 and the second from 2000 to 2002. In both cases, the
size of the underground economy decreased by about 3 percentage points. A
major expansion occurs instead in the 1997-1999 period, when the size of the
underground economy increased by about 5 percentage points.
It is of obvious interest to shed light on the sources behind the pre-
dicted pattern of the underground economy. To this end, Figure 2 plots the
smoothed estimates of the underground economy (in log-deviation from the
steady-state) along with the historical contribution of technological, demand
and scal factors. This picture provides an immediate visual representa-
tion of the relative contribution of each shock to the predicted dynamics of
the underground economy in Italy. As the picture illustrates, the trend of
the underground economy is clearly explained by the scal component (the
sum of the three scal shocks), whereas its uctuations are mostly driven by
movements in the technological shocks. More specically, it is evident that a
rise in the scal component led to a systematic increase of the underground
economy. This feature captures the eect of income and corporate taxation,
which accordingly to the estimated results, have persistently increased over
the 1982-2006 period, as shown in Figure C.13 which plots the smoothed
estimates of each tax rate. The technological component instead, has been
relevant mainly to explain variability of the underground economy around
its upward trend. By contrast, the contribution of the demand shocks (the
sum of preference and investment-specic shocks) is negligible over the whole
sample period.
5.2. Impulse response
The response of the underground economy model to the estimated exoge-
nous shocks can be assessed through the impulse-response functions. This as-
sessment is shown in Figures C.5-C.11, where we graph the impulse-response
functions of regular and underground production, total output (GDP), con-
sumption, investment, and total worked hours along with the 95 percent
17Similar results have been found by Schneider et al. (2010).
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Figure 1: The Estimated size of the underground economy. The picture depicts
the smoothed estimate of the quarterly ratio of underground production to total output.
The series is depicted along with the 95 percent credible interval.
credible intervals.18
To begin with, we note that consumption, investment and total hours
worked all increase in response to an exogenous boost in the ocial sector
productivity, At (see Figure C.5). This is a well-known eect of a positive
technology shock that characterizes any standard real business cycle model
(see, e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999). The presence of the underground econ-
omy, however, implies an additional resource reallocation eect. Because
an increase in the rate of technology At makes the ocial output relatively
18As for the estimated size of the underground economy, these quantities have been
computed as the posterior average of the impulse response functions obtained for each
draw of the MCMC algorithm. The credible intervals have been computed as the 2.5 and
97.5 percentiles of the empirical distributions obtained.
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Figure 2: Historical Decomposition of Underground Production-GDP ratio.
Note: Technology component includes sectorial-specic technology shocks. Fiscal factor
includes shocks on corporate, social security and personal income tax rates. Demand
component is the sum of preference and investment-specic shocks.
more productive, rms nd it more convenient to produce the nal output
with regular workers rather than with irregular workers. Consequently, in
response to a temporary boost in At, the total ocial output increases, while
the underground output declines. This eect partially dampens the response
of total GDP, which, in fact, increases by a lower rate relative to the ocial
output.
The results are reverted when the economy is hit by a temporary boost in
the rate of irregular sector productivity, Bt.
19 In this case, the underground
level of output increases while the ocial level declines, as clearly appears
in Figure C.6. At the posterior parameter values, the eect of this shock
19For instance, the eect provided by an unexpected increase in regular migration.
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on the underground production is strong enough to overcompensate for the
decline in ocial output, and thus total GDP also increases. Interestingly,
this shock also aects the short-run intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
making the households less willing to smooth consumption through saving.
In fact, with a shock of this type, our model predicts that the response of
investment is negative for several quarters after the shock, while the response
of consumption is always positive and hump-shaped.
The impact of scal shocks are summarized in Figures C.7-C.9, where
we report the eects of temporary increases in tax rates. Unsurprisingly,
because taxation is distortive in our framework, the estimated model suggests
that increasing taxes implies a negative response of consumption, investment,
total worked hours and GDP. Furthermore, movements in taxes also imply
a resource reallocation eect: the underground production increases, while
the ocial production declines. In the case of corporate taxation (Figure
C.7) and social security contributions (Figure C.8), this eect is a result of
the higher (net) expected returns from underground production; however,
when considering taxes on personal income (Figure C.9), the eect instead
operates through a labor-supply channel. All else being equal, an increase
of ht induces on impact a larger net wage-gap dierential, thus pushing
households to reallocate their labor services from the regular to the irregular
labor market. This eect provides downward pressure on the irregular labor
wage and, at the same time, upward pressure on the ocial labor wage. As a
result, the rms nd it more convenient to produce a larger portion of their
outputs with irregular workers.
Finally, the eects of demand shocks are provided in Figures C.10 and
C.11, where we graph the response of the economy to a temporary increase in
the rate of transformation of investment in capital and a temporary boost in
the disutility of total hours worked, respectively. As the pictures illustrate,
these two demand shocks have a rather dierent impact on the economy. An
unexpected increase in ht has a depressive eect on the economy, leading to
a decrease in the equilibrium level of all of the main aggregates. This eect
is caused by the lower demand for both investment and consumption goods
that results from a shock of this type. With larger values of ht , in fact,
households experience an increase in the disutility of labor that pushes them
to substitute consumption with leisure over time. This eect results in a lower
demand for both consumption and investment goods and, thus, in a decline
for total production. In contrast, an unexpected increase in It stimulates
the current investment (at the cost of a lower present consumption) and thus
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results in a net increase of aggregate demand to which rms respond by
increasing both underground and ocial production. This is illustrated in
Figure C.10, which shows that, with the exception of consumption, all of the
main economic aggregates increase in response to this shock.
5.3. Cyclical Properties
The top panel of table 2 reports second-order moments for GDP (Yt),
ocial production (Y mt ) and underground output (Y
u
t ). These statistics are
useful to assess the cyclical properties of the underground economy at the
business cycle frequencies. As the table illustrates, the estimated model pre-
dicts that the underground production is a weakly countercyclical and highly
volatile variable over the course of the business cycle. The contemporaneous
correlation of this variable with GDP is, in fact, equal to -0.14, while its
standard deviation is 1.4 times larger than the standard deviation of GDP.
Additionally, our model predicts that the cyclical component of the under-
ground economy is negatively correlated with those of the ocial output
(-0.41). This result is particularly interesting as it provides evidence in favor
of a double business cycle in the Italian economy, with the peaks of the o-
cial economy associated with the troughs of the underground economy and
vice versa.20
The second panel of table 2 presents results from the asymptotical vari-
ance decomposition. Accordingly, the technology shock in the irregular sec-
tor (Bt) is predicted to be the primary driving force of uctuations in the
underground output. As illustrated in the table, this shock alone explains
approximately 80% of the variance in underground production at business
cycle frequencies. The scal component (the sum of the three scal shocks) is
also quantitatively important, explaining around 8% of the overall volatility,
while the contributions of the other shocks are smaller. The contribution of
the scal component becomes quantitatively more important when the un-
derground economy is expressed as a share of GDP, accounting in this case
for 12.71% of the overall volatility. This result hinges on the property that
the scal component also explains a large fraction of regular output volatility
(10.30%). Regarding the other aggregates, we see that consumption, invest-
ment and total hours worked are all particularly sensitive to scal shocks.
20This is particularly true by taking into account that the assumptions we have made
in our model do not guarantee the existence of a double business cycle
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Table 2: Cyclical properties and variance decomposition
Business Cycle Statistics
(Y ut ;Yt) (Y
u
t ;Y
m
t ) (Y
m
t ;Yt)
Correlation -0.14 -0.41 0.96
Relative standard deviation 1.4 1.01 1.38
Asymptotical Variance Decomposition (%)
Variable A B Fiscal Demand
Y ut 6.22 79.92 7.82 6.04
Y mt 86.98 1.40 10.30 1.32
Yt 87.62 2.09 6.99 3.30
Y ut =Yt 49.20 36.73 12.71 1.35
Xt 33.65 6.57 42.78 17.00
Ct 16.32 38.50 25.01 20.17
Ht 39.48 2.91 46.87 10.74
For example, the scal component is the primary driving force of uctuations
in both total hours worked (46:87%) and investment (42:78). This result mir-
rors the intra-temporal and inter-temporal reallocation eects that occur in
our model as a result of exogenous tax changes.
6. Policy Implications
In this section, we use the estimated model to assess the eects of alterna-
tive scal policies. The current Italian sovereign debt crisis has strengthened
the urge among Italian policy makers to design suitable policies to ght tax
evasion. This issue is perceived as a priority in Italy not only to increase s-
cal revenues to prevent the risk of national default but also to improve scal
equity among individuals. Given the size of the informal sector in Italy, it is
clear that to achieve these targets in an ecient manner, it is of fundamental
importance to know how the underground economy reacts to dierent scal
and institutional stimuli. From this perspective, one of the main advantages
of our approach, with respect to the more traditional methodologies, is that
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it provides a natural laboratory from which to derive general equilibrium
implications of scal policies.
6.1. The Laer curve
According to the OECD statistics, in the year 2009, the tax revenues to
GDP ratio was 43:4% for Italy, a scal pressure that was higher than both the
OECD and the European averages (respectively, 33:8% and 37:1%). Because
of this evidence, there exists a certain agreement among Italian economists
that the scal burden is responsible not only for tax evasion but also for
discouraging foreign direct investment and weakening the competitiveness of
Italian rms. In this respect, a widespread idea is that a general reduction
in the tax burden would benet the Italian economy.
A test for this claim is provided in Figure 3, which illustrates the steady-
state eects to changes in the corporate tax rate  c. Keeping all of the
other parameters xed to their posterior mean values, the picture depicts
total scal revenues (Laer curve), tax evasion (in percentage terms, with
respect to the overall amount of taxes due) and regular and total output as
functions of the steady-state corporate tax rate. As illustrated in the left
panel of the picture, the estimated steady-state Laer curve (the continuous
blue line) has the typical textbook inverted U-shape, with a maximum at
 c equal to approximately 26%. This result conforms to previous studies
(e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 1997; Trabandt and Uhlig, 2009), which also
show the existence of a Laer curve in standard neoclassical growth models.
In our model, however, the shape of the Laer curve is determined by two
related eects. On the one hand, an increase in the corporate tax rate reduces
the equilibrium level of regular output (see the continuous line in the right-
bottom panel), thus lowering the tax base. This is the traditional eect of
distortive taxation. On the other hand, the concealed taxes as a share of the
total tax base (a measure of the strength of tax evasion) is a convex function
of the corporate tax rate, which increases quickly as  c moves from low to
high values. This is an additional eect that is due to the presence of the
underground sector in the economy. For a suciently large  c, the above
eects dominate the one induced by a larger tax rate, leading then to a
monotonically decreasing pattern of scal revenues. Note that at the average
corporate tax rate (the vertical line in the left panel), Italy is on the slippery
side of the Laer curve and therefore can improve its budgetary situation
by cutting corporate taxes. Additionally, the picture illustrates that the
expansion in underground production that results from the higher corporate
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Figure 3: Steady-state eects of corporate taxation. This picture depicts the steady-
state Laer curve, total tax evasion and regular and total output as a function of the
steady-state corporate tax rate  c. All the other parameters are kept xed to their poste-
rior mean values. Total tax evasion is expressed as a share of total taxes due.
tax rates is not strong enough to completely compensate for the decline
of regular output, and thus the equilibrium level of the overall production
monotonically decreases with  c (see the dashed line in the right-bottom
panel). Hence, the estimated model predicts that in the long run, a reduction
in the corporate tax rate would eectively benet the Italian economy in
terms of both higher scal revenues and higher total production. These
results are generally conrmed in Figure 4, which illustrates the eects upon
total scal revenues and the economic activity of changes in the income tax
rate h.
Figures 3 and 4 also depict the steady-state Laer curve for an economy
without the underground sector (see the dashed line).21 The comparison
21The alternative Laer curves are obtained by setting all of the parameters of the model
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between the complete enforcement economy and the benchmark model high-
lights the importance of the underground sector for scal policy purposes.
First of all, we note that the loss of scal revenues due to tax evasion is
remarkable. At the average corporate tax rate, for example, the gap between
revenues collected and the potential ones amounts to 11 percentage points
of GDP, a results similar to that found by Busato and Chiarini (2012). Fur-
thermore, Figure 3 illustrates that at the average corporate rate, Italy is
located on the left side of the full enforcement Laer curve and could suc-
cessfully increase tax revenues by raising the tax rate. This result contrasts
with the predictions of the benchmark model, thereby suggesting that lack
of proper consideration for the underground sector might be dramatically
misleading while undertaking scal policy interventions. In Figures 3 and 4,
we also graph the Laer curves by setting the probability parameter p to 0.2
instead of to 0.03 as in the benchmark case. This experiment is useful to
assess the eects of a stronger enforcement eort. By comparing the contin-
uous and dotted curves in both pictures, we see that increasing parameter p
has the eect of shifting the Laer curve to the right, and thus the gap be-
tween taxes actually collected and the potential ones decreases for any given
tax rate. This means that scal policies which credibly raise the perceived
probability of being detected evading, successfully increase the steady-state
scal revenues. Alternatively, the estimated model predicts that at the ac-
tual tax rates, the Italian government might eectively raise scal revenues
by increasing the eort in the monitoring process.
6.2. Transitional Dynamics
We now characterize transitional dynamics and welfare eects of three dif-
ferent scal policies: (i) a general tax cut; (ii) an increase in the monitoring
eort; and (iii) a mix between the above two policies. Results are provided
in Figures C.14 and C.15 where we plot the transition path of selected en-
dogenous variables, and in Table 3 which summarizes the steady-state eects
and welfare implications of each alternative scal policy. Welfare gains are
evaluated at the steady-state, as percentage deviation of households utility
with respect to the benchmark counterpart (U), as well as over the tran-
sition path, as ratio of equivalent consumption, Ce, to the benchmark level
of steady-state consumption, Cb. For each policy, Ce is calculated as the
without underground economy at their posterior mean values.
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Figure 4: Steady-state eects of personal income taxation. This picture depicts
the steady-state Laer curve, total tax evasion and regular and total output as a function
of the steady-state income tax rate h. All the other parameters are kept xed to their
posterior mean values. Total tax evasion is expressed as a share of total taxes due.
permanent level of consumption that provides to households the same utility
they get along the whole transition path.
6.2.1. A general tax cut
We begin our analysis by characterizing the eects of a general tax cut,
assuming that each tax rate is permanently reduced by 2 percentage points.
As illustrated in the rst row of Table 3, a general tax cut has a positive eect
on the economic activity. Relative to the benchmark economy, in the new
steady-state, capital, consumption and GDP increase by 9.46%, 6.89% and
4.38%, respectively. The transition paths of these aggregates are depicted in
Figure C.14. We see that consumption, GDP, and capital monotonically con-
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verge to the new steady-state, while investment overshoots.22 The relatively
slow rate of convergence of these aggregates implies that, although scal pol-
icy has no eect on the long-run growth, a general tax cut has a sustained
impact on their growth rates for substantial periods during the transition.
Hours worked also increase relative to the benchmark case, and this eect is
due the excess demand that occurs in the labor market because of the lower
tax rates.23 However, despite the induced increase in hours worked, we nd
that a general tax cut is welfare-improving, both in the new steady-state
(U = 3.52%), and during the whole transition path (Ce=Cb = 1:06). The
welfare-improvement eect of the policy is clearly driven by the consump-
tion pattern, which more than compensates for the higher disutility arising
from the increased equilibrium level of hours worked. According to our re-
sults, the policy is also eective in discouraging tax evasion, which in the
long-run declines by 9.08%. In terms of transition, Figure C.14 shows that
in the quarter immediately after the tax cut, tax evasion jumps below its
new steady-state value, gradually increasing thereafter. This pattern mir-
rors the dynamic response of the concealed production, which also declines
in the steady-state by 3.37%. This last eect, together with the increase in
total production, implies that the tax cut reduced the steady-state size of
the underground economy (Y u=Y ) by 7.43%. Finally, Figure C.14 shows
that scal revenues overshoot during the transition path, staying below the
benchmark level for almost 3 years after the tax cut. This result appears
particularly important from the standpoint of scal policy, as it shows that
a general tax cut, although increasing scal revenues in the long-run, may
nevertheless worsen the budgetary situation in the short-run.
6.2.2. A stronger tax enforcement
We now assess the eects of a permanent increase in the tax enforcement
eort. To this end, we set the probability parameter p to 0.10 instead of to
0.03, while holding the remaining parameters at their posterior mean val-
ues. The value assigned to parameter p has been chosen such that, in the
new steady-state, total scal revenues are exactly the same as those resulting
from the general cut tax analyzed above. This choice makes the two poli-
22These dynamics resemble those of a standard neoclassical growth model due to a
capital stock which is below its steady-state value.
23This eect is apparent in Figure C.14, which shows that over the whole transition to the
new steady-state, both sectorial wage rates are larger than they benchmark counterparts.
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Table 3: Steady-state eects and welfare implications
Steady-State Eects (%) Welfare
G TE Y
u
Y
Y u Y m Y C K U Ce
Cb
Tax Cut 1.71 -9.08 -7.43 -3.37 6.53 4.38 6.89 9.46 3.52 1.06
Larger p 1.71 -9.00 -3.30 -3.56 0.65 -0.26 -2.94 -1.67 -0.87 0.97
Mix 3.27 -17.2 -10.5 -6.84 7.13 4.10 4.11 7.83 2.77 1.03
Note: for each variable, steady-state eects are computed as percentage deviations
from their benchmark counterparts. G refers to scal revenues.
cies equivalent in terms of long-run impact on scal revenues, and therefore
facilitates the comparison between them. Steady-state eects and welfare
implications of the policy are reported in the second row of Table 3, while
Figure C.14 depicts the transitional dynamics. Apart from the impact on
tax evasion and scal revenues, we note that the eects of a stronger enforce-
ment are dramatically dierent from those resulting from the comparable
tax cut. Precisely, we observe a decline for GDP, consumption and capital
in the new steady-state equilibrium, meaning that the policy has depressive
eects on the economy activity. The intuition for this result is straight-
forward. On the one hand, since the policy leaves tax rates unchanged, a
stronger enforcement eort stimulates the regular production only through
the induced inter-sectorial reallocation of resources. Consequently, the un-
derground production decreases while the regular production increases, but
with a net eect on GDP that is virtually equal to zero. On the other hand,
given the balanced-budget rule, the increase in scal revenues resulting from
the policy are used by the government to nance a larger amount of waste-
ful public expenditures. These two eects jointly imply that the amount of
resources available for the private sector decreases in equilibrium, thereby
crowding-out consumption and investment both in the steady-state and dur-
ing the whole transition path. Hours worked instead increase, but now the
eect is driven by the excess of labor supply resulting from the negative
wealth eect provided by the policy. This result is apparent in Figure C.14,
which shows that both regular and unregular wages stay permanently be-
low their benchmark counterparts. The increase in labor supply, and the
declining pattern of consumption, jointly imply that the policy is welfare-
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deteriorating, as summarized in Table 3. As a result, although in our model
the government may completely eliminate the underground production by
setting the parameters p and s accordingly, this policy would nevertheless
be suboptimal, as it would induce welfare looses. Finally, Figure C.14 shows
that scal revenues increase by 4% on impact, gradually converging to the
new steady-state thereafter. Unlike the tax cut policy, this nding shows
that a permanently stronger enforcement increases scal revenues also in the
very short-run.
6.2.3. Policy mix
We evaluate next the eects of a mix between the two policies analyzed
above. We assume therefore that government permanently cuts each tax rate
by 2 percentage points, and simultaneously increases the eort in the mon-
itoring process, which permanently raises the probability p to 0.10. Results
of this experiment are provided in the last row of Table 3, and in Figure C.15
where the transitional dynamics due to the policy mix are compared with
those induced by the tax cut alone. We see that the eects of the policy
resemble pretty much those resulting from a general tax cut. The policy
stimulates the economic activity, and is welfare improving, although with a
quantitatively smaller impact with respect to the tax cut alone. Also, we
nd that mixing the two policies is very eective in discouraging tax evasion,
which in the quarter immediately after the policy changes falls by about 18%,
and then gradually converges to the new steady-state. Again, this pattern
mirrors the response of the underground production, which in the long-run
decreases by 6.78%. Because of this eect, and given the expansion in GDP,
the policy mix induces a signicant decrease in the size of the underground
economy, which in the steady-state falls by 10.5%. Most importantly, we nd
that the mixing the two policies raises scal revenues both in the steady-state
(3.27%), and during the whole transition path. According to these results,
for Italy would therefore be desirable to implement a general tax cut accom-
panied by stronger monitoring process since, as we have seen, this policy may
increase welfare and, at the same time, permanently improve the budgetary
situation.
7. Some concluding remarks
In this paper, we develop and estimate a two-sector DSGE model that
explicitly accounts for concealed transactions in the economy. Our goal is
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twofold: to estimate size and trend of the underground economy and to
assess the eects of alternative scal policies in an economic environment
characterized by tax evasion.
We apply our methodology to the Italian economy, using quarterly aggre-
gate data covering the period 1982-2006. The Bayesian estimate of the model
produces a time series for the underground economy which is, on average,
about 4 percentage points larger than the ocial estimates. Additionally, we
nd evidence of a steadily upward trend in the size of the underground econ-
omy, primarily driven by the persistent increase in taxation that has been
observed in Italy since the eighties. As far as scal policy is concerned, nu-
merical experiments based on the estimated model show that, at the actual
tax rates, Italy is on the slippery side of the steady-state Laer curve, and
can improve its budgetary situation by either reducing taxes or increasing
the tax enforcement. However, the analysis of transitional dynamics reveals
that for the government would be optimal to undertake a mix between the
above two policies, as this turns out to be the only scal adjustment that can
improve welfare and, at the same time, permanently increase scal revenues.
To conclude, we wish to stress that the methodology presented in this
paper provides a new method to estimate the underground economy. The
novelty of our approach with respect to those available in the literature, is
the use of a structural model where the underground economy is treated as
an integral part of the economic system. This method allows to estimate the
unobservable underground economy by exploiting the information provided
by equilibrium conditions of the model. We believe that this methodology is
quite general and can readily be applied to other countries to perform com-
parative analysis of the sources of the underground economy. Moreover, the
theoretical model can be easily modied to assess the labor market implica-
tions. However, we left these issues for future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Method
The basic idea behind the MCMC is to build a Markov chain transition
kernel starting from a given initial point and with a limiting invariant distri-
bution that is equal to the posterior distribution of the quantities of interest.
Under suitable conditions (see Robert and Casella, 1999, chap. 6-7), such a
transition kernel converges in the distribution to the target posterior density
p(jy). These Markov chain trajectories are obtained through simulations
following a two-step procedure. First, a new movement is proposed by simu-
lating the new position from a proposal distribution, and, second, this move
is accepted or rejected according to some suitable probabilities that depend
on the likelihood function and on the prior distribution of the parameters
p(). In a nutshell, given a starting value for the parameter's vector (0),
we simulate trajectories of the Markov chain f(j); j = 1; : : : ; ng whose
draws converge to the posterior distribution. Once convergence is achieved,
the inference can be based on the generated serially dependent sample sim-
ulated from the posterior. More precisely, the estimates of the posterior
means Ep(jy)[] are obtained by averaging over the realization of the chains,
i.e., ^ = n 1
Pn
j=1 
(j). To account for the serial correlation induced by the
Markovian nature of this procedure, we estimate the numerical standard error
of the sample posterior mean using the approach implemented, for instance,
in Kim et al. (1998).
In the MCMC literature, there are many dierent ways to propose a
move for the Markov chain. Our inferential procedure is based on a Random
Walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, as suggested, for instance, in An and
Schorfheide (2007), in which the proposal distribution depends uniquely on
the current state of the chain at time j, i.e., q(j(j)). The procedure can be
summarized as follows:
MCMC algorithm
 Initialize the chain at (0)
 At step j = 1; : : : ; n
{ Update  in block through a random walk Metropolis-Hastings
scheme
  q(j(j 1));
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{ Compute the acceptance probability ((j 1);) dened as
((j 1);) =
p()L(yj)q((j 1)j)
p((j 1))L(yj(j 1))q(j(j 1))
{ Draw u from an U(0; 1) random variable. If ((j 1);)  u
 Then (j) = ;
 Else (j) = (j 1);
 j = j + 1
Appendix B. The complete log-linearized model
In what follows, we describe the log-linearized equilibrium system of equa-
tion. Notice that coecient evaluated at the steady-state are indicated with
the sub-index ss. Taxes at the steady-state are indicated just suppressing
the temporal index.
w^mt = y^
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t   h^mt  

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^ ct  

 s
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Appendix C. Impulse-Response Functions
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Figure C.5: Technology Shock. Regular Economy. At
43
0 10 20 30 40
?0.4
?0.3
?0.2
?0.1
0
0.1
Regular Economy
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
Undergraund Economy
0 10 20 30 40
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Consumption
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Investment
0 10 20 30 40
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
GDP
0 10 20 30 40
?0.25
?0.2
?0.15
?0.1
?0.05
0
Total Hours Worked
Figure C.6: Technology Shock. Underground Economy. Bt
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Figure C.7: Fiscal Shock. Corporate Tax Rate. c
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Figure C.8: Fiscal Shock. Social Security Tax Rate. s
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Figure C.9: Fiscal Shock. Personal Income Tax Rate. h
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Figure C.10: Demand Shock. Investment Shock. I
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Figure C.11: Demand Shock. Disutility of labor. h
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